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I. INTRODUCrION

In 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida made a bold move in an attempt
to improve the manner in which zoning decisions are made in the state.
Landowners had long chafed under a system in which courts reviewed
local government zoning decisions with the utmost deference.1 Many
believed that the deference courts applied to such decisions had allowed
arbitrary and unfair zoning practices to undercut the very purpose of zoning
* Editor's Note: This Note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Prize for the
Outstanding Note written during the Spring 1999 semester.
** To Lara: my friend, my love, my wife. Special thanks to my parents, Charles and Carol
Penn, for teaching me what hard work and sacrifice mean.
1. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,472-73 (Fla. 1993).
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ordinances themselves: the creation of well-planned communities.2 The
court in Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder sought, at least
partially, to limit such unfairness by changing the standard and procedure
of review of local government decisionmaking.3 The subject of this note
is what has come of the Snyder decision in the last part of the decade.
First, this Note will explore how the Snyder framework has been
applied to other areas of land use planning, most importantly amendments
to local comprehensive plans. Second, this Note will describe the judicial
reaction to the new standard of review established by the Snyder decision.
Some recent decisions have raised some serious doubts that Snyder has
made any difference at all in reducing arbitrary decisionmaking, at least in
one Florida District. Finally, this Note will explore how courts have
adapted to the new procedural framework under Snyder.It seems that some
district courts have had trouble adjusting to their new role in the postSnyder world.
11. THE ORIGINS OF THE "FAIRLY DEBATABLE" RuLE:

VILLAGE OF EUCLID V.AMBLER REALTY

In 1926, the Supreme Court first recognized the constitutionality of
zoning ordinances in the seminal case of Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. 4 The Euclid Village Council had adopted a comprehensive zoning
ordinance which divided the village's area into use, height, and area
districts.5 The plaintiff landowner complained that the ordinance deprived
it of its property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
requirement.'
In upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, the Court found that
modem urban life required some flexibility to allow local governments to
ensure the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry.7 The Court
recognized that problems "constantly are developing, which require...
additional restrictions in respect of the use of occupation and private lands
in urban communities."' In recognizing this "elasticity," the Court held that
the provisions of Euclid's ordinance would have to be "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" if they are to be declared

2. See id.
3. Id. at 472-75.

4. 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926).
5. See id. at 379-80.
6. See id. at 384. The plaintiff's complaint was based on the fact that its large parcel had
been placed in three use districts, two of which did not allow the industrial use it sought for the
parcel, and the overall property's value had been unconstitutionally lessened. See id. at 382-84.
7. See id. at 386-87.

8. Id.
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unconstitutional.9 The Court found that the landowner had not shown that
the Village had acted in such a way, and the standard of review which
would come to be known as "fairly debatable" was born. 10
The Supreme Court of Florida expressly adopted the fairly debatable
standard in 194 1's City of MiamiBeach v. Ocean & Inland Co." Florida's
version of the rule is perhaps best summarized by the supreme court's
opinion in City ofMiami Beach v. Lachman. 2 In that case, the court wrote
that "an ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason
it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to
a logical deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity."' 3 It
is this extreme deference to local government decisionmaking that Jack
and Gail Snyder faced when they sought to challenge
a local government's
4
rejection of a zoning change to their property.'
IlI. THE SNYDER DECISION

In Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, the Snyders owned a
half-acre parcel on Merritt Island in unincorporated Brevard County.15 The
parcel was zoned "GU" (general use), a classification which allowed for
single family homes to be built.'6 The Snyders filed an application with the
County to rezone the property to a zoning classification which would allow
9. Id.
at 395 (citing Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,530-31(1917)).
10. See id.
at 395-97.The expansive language of the Euclid decision found some limitation
two years later when the Court applied the new rule for a second time in Nectow v.City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928). As in Euclid, the plaintiff in Nectow argued that the
zoning ordinance applied to his property violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
See id.
at 185. The ordinance split the plaintiff's tract into two uneven parcels, a parcel zoned for
strictly residential and the much larger remainder zoned for unlimited use. See id. at 186. A master
had initially tried the case and the Court relied heavily on his findings of fact. See id. The master
had found that plaintiff's tract was surrounded on two sides by industrial and railroad uses and that
"no practical use can be made of [the smaller parcel] for residential purposes" largely because it
would be impossible to make adequate return on residential development. Id. at 187. As a result,
the master had found that neither the "health, safety, convenience and general welfare" of the
immediateneighborhood ortheentirecity would benefit from the zoning designation. Id. TheCourt
agreed, adding that it found that the inclusion of the smaller parcel in a residential district was not
"indispensable" to the City's general zoning plan. Id. at 187-88. WhatNectow signaled was that the
Court was not going to allow local governments to escape judicial scrutiny of zoning decisions
entirely. The Nectow Court even undertook to show the City of Cambridge how it could have
redrawn the zoning lines so that the system would make more sense. Id. Despite the language in
Nectow suggesting morejudicial scrutiny of zoning decisions, it was not to be. The relaxed standard
of Euclid would rule the country's, and Florida's, land use law for decades to come.
11. 3 So. 2d 364,366-67 (Fla. 1941).
12. 71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953).
13. Id.

14. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469,471 (Fla. 1993).
15. See id.
16. Seeid.
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up to fifteen units per acre.7 The County's Future Land Use Map (FLUM)
designated the area for "residential use," a designation that was consistent
with twenty-nine zoning classifications, including the one that the Snyders
sought."1
The County's planning and zoning board heard the Snyders' request
and approved it. 9 The Snyders then came before the County Commission
to gain final approval for the zoning change.2" The Commission heard from
a number of citizens who spoke against changing the zoning of the parcel.2"
The citizens objected mainly to an increase in traffic that they believed
would be caused by the development.22 After hearing evidence on both
sides, the Commission voted to deny the Snyders' application without
providing a reason for the decision.23
After their petition for certiorari was denied by the circuit court, the
Snyders petitioned and were heard by the Fifth District Court of Appeal.2"
The district court held that the fairly debatable rule was inapplicable and
found for the Snyders.25 The Supreme Court of Florida then reviewed the
case because of its conflict with both district and supreme court cases and
again found for the Snyders.26
The Snyder court acknowledged the long history of the fairly debatable
rule in zoning jurisprudence, but noted that it had increasingly come under
fire for encouraging arbitrary and poor land use decisions. 27 The court went
on to discuss how the Florida Legislature had become a national leader in
reform of land use decisionmaking with the passage of the Growth
Management Act (GMA) in 1985. 2 Under the GMA, local governments
are required to develop comprehensive plans which are subject to approval

17. See id.

18. See id. Section 163 of the Florida Statutes, otherwise known as the "Local Government
Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act," requires all local governments
to develop a comprehensive plan. FIA. STAT. § 163.3167 (1997). A required element of the
comprehensive plan is what' is known as the "future land use element." See FLA. STAT. §
163.3177(6)a (1997). Central to the future land use element is the FLUM, which is required to
show the "proposed future equal distribution, location, and extent" of the various categories of land
use for the local government's jurisdiction. Id. The FLUM is different from a zoning map in that
it addresses both current and future land uses for an area. See id.
19. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 471.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. Snyder told the Commission that he planned to only build five or six units, fewer
than the zoning designation would allow. See id.
23. See 1d.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 470-71.
27. See id. at 472.
28. See id. The GMA has now been replaced by the current Section 163.
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by the state's Department of Community Affairs (DCA).2 9 The
comprehensive plan must contain, along with many other elements, the
local government's plans for dealing with most elements of future land use
for its jurisdiction."0
Central to the future land use element required by the GMA is the
FLUM, which designates the future growth patterns of the jurisdiction.3
The GMA also requires that all development regulations adopted by the
local government must be consistent with the comprehensive plan." This
consistency requirement embraces both approvals and denials of
development orders, which, in turn, include zoning permit applications."
It is in the shadow of the GMA's new requirements that the Snyder
court decided to retreat from the fairly debatable rule and turn to strict
scrutiny as the standard for reviewing local government zoning decisions.34
Noting that the fairly debatable rule was the appropriate standard for courts
to apply when a legislative action is challenged, the court first determined
that the zoning hearing before them was not legislative, but quasijudicial.3" To reach this result, the court applied a functional analysis,
reasoning that the character of the hearing determines the nature of the
action undertaken.36
The Snyder court found that the board action before them was quasijudicial because it resulted in the application of a general rule rather than
its formulation. 7 The actual creation of policy in the court's view was the
enactment of an original zoning plan.38 In a rezoning action such as the one
in Snyder, the court found that local governments are not making policy,
but applying it.3 9 Thus, the court ruled that strict scrutiny should be applied
to the local government's decisionmaking in similar situations.40
The Snyder rule places its initial burden on the landowner.4 ' If the
landowner meets the burden of showing that the rezoning proposal is
consistent with the comprehensive plan, the burdens of production and
persuasion shift to the local government.42 The local government will have

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.; FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2) (1997).
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 472; FLA. STAT.
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)a (1997).
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3) (1997).
See FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(7), (8) (1997).
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474.
See id. at 474-75.
See id. at 474.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 476.
See id.

§ 163.3177(6)a (1997).
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to show why denying the rezoning accomplishes a "legitimate public
purpose."43 The local government must also show that the zoning board or
similar body had "competent substantial evidence" before it which
supported the ruling.44 If the local government meets this burden, the
decision to deny a rezoning application will stand. 45 The court noted that
findings of fact by the local board may be useful but would not be
required.46
The court recognized several limits to the new rule. First, and most
obviously, the requested zoning change must be consistent with the
comprehensive plan to be given presumptive validity.47 Second, the court
recognized that comprehensive plans are designed to forecast long-range
maximum uses on land and may include use categories which are currently
inappropriate for a parcel.48 For example, Brevard County's comprehensive
plan included twenty-nine potential zoning classifications for the Snyder's
property. 49 Given the general nature of comprehensive plan designations,
the court found that local governments should retain the discretion to deny
a use consistent with the plan, at least when substantial competent
evidence supports it."
Third, the court explicitly rejected the view of the district court as to the
effect of a showing of consistency by the landowner.51 The district court
had ruled that a landowner's showing of consistency with the
comprehensive plan provided a presumption of validity that the local
government can only overcome with a showing that some public necessity
requires a more restricted use. 2 The court rejected such a strong
presumption in favor of the landowner when the local government's action
is also consistent with the plan, finding that it would be unduly restrictive
on local governments. 3 Finally, the court recognized that some rezonings
which are "comprehensive" and affect a "large portion of the public are
legislative in nature."54 Such rezoning decisions would still be judged
under the fairly debatable rule. 5

43. Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 475.
See id. at471.
See id. at 475.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 474.
See id.
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IV. THE LIMrTs OF QUASI-JUDICIAL: COMPREHENSIVE
PLAN AMENDMENTS

The Snyder court left many questions unanswered as to which land use
decisions are quasi-judicial in nature. Perhaps most importantly, the court
did not address what standard should apply to changes in the local
government's comprehensive plan. Since they typically cover a significant
area, most comprehensive plan amendments would likely be easily placed
within the language in Snyder of a "comprehensive rezoning" and thus be
judged to be legislative. 6 What quickly arose in the lower courts, however,
was the question of what standard should apply when comprehensive plan
amendments are not "comprehensive" in scope, but more akin to the
rezoning of a single parcel. The next three years would bring a series of
inconsistent district court opinions on the issue, followed by a not entirely
satisfactory supreme court decision.
In 1994's FloridaInstitute of Technology, Inc. v. Martin County,57 the
Fourth District found that a hearing denying a single parcel comprehensive
plan amendment was quasi-judicial and thus subject to the Snyder rule. 8
The Florida Institute of Technology owned an 81-acre parcel in Martin
County.59 The previous owner had received a Planned Unit Development
(PUD) designation for the parcel in the County's comprehensive plan.6"
The County's staff was concerned about the validity of the prior
amendment and suggested the County initiate another amendment. 61 At a
subsequent hearing, the County Commission decided not to adopt the
amendment.62
In finding the County's action quasi-judicial, the court relied heavily on
the language from Snyder?3 in which the supreme court had focused on
changes in the designation of a particular piece of property. The Snyder
court had found that such changes are properly seen as quasi-judicial
because they involve a limited number of property owners, identifiable
parties, and "facts arrived at from distinct alternatives presented at a
hearing." ' The FloridaInstitute court, however, did not ignore the Snyder
court's focus on the difference between creating and applying policy65 and

56. Id.
57. 641 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

58. Id. at 900.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 898.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474.
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Board of Comm'r, 595 So. 2d 65, 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)).
See id.
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found that policymaking may have been involved in the decision.66 This
finding suggests that the amendment should be deemed a legislative act.
While recognizing that the decision may have involved some policy
changes, the court found that the "hybrid" of a single parcel comprehensive
plan amendment called for the application of the Snyder rule.67 Thus, the
court's application of Snyder's functional analysis led the court to decide
that the Commission's actions were more judicial than legislative.68
The Fourth District did an abrupt about-face just three months later in
Section 28 Partnershipv. Martin County, finding a comprehensive plan
amendment to be legislative in nature.69 In Section 28 Partnership,the
appellant partnership had sought an amendment to the County's7 °
comprehensive plan to allow a 638-acre parcel to be developed as a PUD.
In order to develop the PUD, the partnership requested an amendment that
would have created a novel category in the comprehensive plan. 71 The
court found that the County's decision to reject the proposal was legislative
in nature.72
First, the court recognized that the creation of a novel category in the
plan would be the formulation of policy.7 3 However, the court did not find
this to be dispositive. 74 The partnership argued that the amendment would
be "site-specific" and thus should be treated as quasi-judicial under
Snyder.75 However, the court also rejected this as being dispositive, finding
that the fact that the amendment involved only one parcel, albeit a large
one, would not in itself determine the issue.7 6
The court focused instead on the fact that the parcel was bordered on
two sides by a state park and a preserve area. 7 It was the "pristine nature"
of the park and preserve and the public recreational use of the two areas
78
that encouraged the court to find that the Snyder rule should not apply.

66. See FloridaInstitute, 641 So. 2d at 900.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. 642 So. 2d 609, 609-10 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
70. See id. at612.
71. See id.The partnership requested a designation called an Adjacent County Urban Service
Area. See id. This designation would allow the partnership to take advantage of county services in
adjacent Palm Beach County. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. The property was bordered by the Jonathan Dickinson State Park and the
Loxahatchee River Preserve area. See id.
78. See id.The court distinguished the FloridaInstitutecase by pointing out that, in that case,
the same parcel had previously been amended for a prior owner and the petitioner was seeking to
enforce that amendment. See id. at 612 n.2. The court, however, failed to explain exactly why that
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The court relied on the language from Snyder in which the supreme court
found that those government decisions which are comprehensive and affect
a large portion of the public should be deemed legislative in nature.7 9 It
thus seems that the public involvement in the park and preserve was the
deciding factor for the court.
Under the Section 28 Partnershipcourt's application of the Snyder
functional analysis, it seems that a comprehensive plan amendment would
not be a legislative act unless a significant portion of the public would be
directly affected, either because of the large area involved or the existence
of a special public interest."0 The Section 28 Partnershipcourt dealt with
a situation in which both a single-site comprehensive plan amendment was
required and the decision would have a significant impact on the
community at large. The question remained, however: what would the
result be if a single parcel amendment did not present such an obvious
public interest?
The supreme court addressed such an issue in Martin County v. Yusem,
three years after the Section 28 Partnership decisibn, and found that
hearings on comprehensive plan amendments were legislative, not quasi1 The Respondent, Mr. Yusem,
judicial, and thus not subject to Snyder."
owned a fifty-four acre parcel in Martin County that was limited to one
residential unit per two acres on the county's FLUM. 2 Yusem requested
an amendment to the FLUM in order to increase the allowable density on
his parcel to two units per acre.83 The county initially agreed to amend the

changed the nature of the hearing significantly. See id. The FloridaInstitutecase involved a PUD
designation which the prior owner had never utilized. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
The county itself initiated the change in the FLUM because county staff were concerned about the
validity of the existing approval. See id. The board's action could thus be seen as application of
policy. The problem with that approach can be seen by looking at the original amendment. It
involved a single parcel as well. See id. Under the court's interpretation of Snyder, the initial
amendment decision likely should be seen as quasi-judicial. If the initial amendment was quasijudicial, it becomes hard to see how the second amendment could be the application of policy
created through the initial amendment, given that quasi-judicial hearings are not supposed to create
policy.
79. See Section 28 Partnership,642 So. 2d at 612.
80. See id. Judge Stone concurred with the opinion but wrote separately, indicating that he
would have found the county's decision to be legislative absent the novel designation category and
the great public interest. See id. (Stone, J., concurring). Instead, Judge Stone would find any
decision regarding whether to amend a comprehensive plan as legislative. See id. (Stone, J.,
concurring).
81. 690 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1997).
82. See id. at 1289-90.
83. See id. Yusem also sought a rezoning of the property along with the plan amendment
which would change his zoning designation from an agricultural use to a residential PUD. See id.
at 1290.
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parcel's designation and began the process required by the state.8a The
DCA, however, found the proposed amendment lacked the requisite data
and gave the county the choice of either abandoning the amendment or
revising the supporting data.85 The County Board of Commissioners then
held another hearing on the proposed amendment and decided not to
pursue it further.86

Yusem sued and the circuit court, relying on Snyder, found that the
board's decision was quasi-judicial.8 7 On appeal, the Fourth District again
applied Snyder's functional analysis and upheld the circuit court's decision
because the change would have a limited effect on the public.88 Thus, the
Fourth District here had faced a situation that was lacking in Section 28
Partnership,a single-site comprehensive plan amendment in which the
court could not find a significant public interest. 89 It found that the lack of
significant public interest was enough to make the hearing a quasi-judicial
undertaking.' °
In disagreeing with the lower courts, the supreme court also rejected the
functional analysis it had utilized in Snyder.9 Instead, the court decided to
remove any confusion as to the issue and expressly concluded that
amendments to comprehensive plans are legislative.92 The bright-line rule
adopted by the court also expressly covered single parcels.93
The heart of the reasoning of the Yusem court's decision came from
Judge, now Justice, Pariente's dissent to the district court's opinion.94 In
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Martin County v. Yusem, 664 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
89. See id. The District also relied on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in City of
Melbourne v. Puma. 630 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1994); see Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 977-78. The Florida
Supreme Court in Pumahad dealt with a rezoning request and remanded it for further consideration
in light of Snyder.See Puma, 630 So. 2d at 1097. As the court in Yusem noted, the Fourth District
interpreted the remand in Puma to be support for its position that certain plan amendments should
fall within Snyder. See Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 978. This was based on the fact that the rezoning in
Puma would require a plan amendment, an issue that the supreme court did not mention in its
opinion. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1291. Thus, the Fourth District took the supreme court's silence
on the amendment issue to be a sign of agreement with its point of view. See id.
90. See Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 976-77.
91. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1293.
92. See id. The court cited at length Judge, now Justice, Pariente's dissent from the District
opinion. See id. at 1291. Judge Pariente had argued that the initial passage of a comprehensive plan
was a legislative act since it involved important policy choices. See id. Judge Pariente had seen no
reason to treat the process of amending the comprehensive plan any differently. See id. The court
also noted that Judge Pariente had argued that such a bright-line rule would "provide clarity to the
procedures involved in this otherwise confusing area of the law." Id.
93. See id. at 1293.
94. See id. at 1293-94.
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her dissent, Judge Pariente had argued that any comprehensive plan
amendment involves a "policy reformulation."'9 5 Given that an amendment
necessarily involved a reconsideration of a local government's "provision
for local services, capital expenditures, and its overall plan for growth and
future development of the surrounding area," Judge Pariente argued that
considerations involved in any such decision would go far beyond an
individual parcel.96 In her view, all amendments, no matter the size of the

parcel, were actions creating policy rather than applying it.97
The Yusem court also remarked that the "integrated review" process
involved in the adoption of amendments to comprehensive plans gave
support to its view. 98 The first step in the process of amending the plan
rests at the local government level.99 If the local government decides to
amend the plan, it transmits it to the DCA for review. 1' ° The DCA
responds with any objections or changes it finds necessary to make the
amendment consistent with the local, regional, and state comprehensive
plans. 10 1 The local government then has the opportunity to adopt the
amendment as is, alter it to meet the DCA's request, or reject it
completely."°2 Assuming the amendment is adopted by the local
government, the DCA again reviews it. 3 If the DCA does not find it
objectionable after staff review and an administrative hearing, the
amendment process is complete. " The court found that the strict oversight
involved in the amendment process clearly pointed to a policy decision.0 5
The Yusem court's abandonment of the functional analysis of Snyder
and embrace of a bright-line approach brought some needed clarity to the
post-Snyderjurisprudence. As the Fourth District opinions showed, relying
on a functional analysis regarding comprehensive plan amendments often
resulted in contradictory and confused opinions. However, the functional

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. (citing Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 981 (Pariente, J., dissenting)).
Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 981 (Pariente, J.,
dissenting).
See id.
Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294.
99. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(3) (1997).
100. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294; FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(4) (1997).
101. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294.
102. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(7) (1997).
103. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294; see also FLA.STAT. § 163.3184(8) (1997).
104. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294. If, however, the DCA finds that the amendment is not
consistent with the Act, the State's comprehensive plan and the DCA's own minimum criteria rule,
the amendment is passed on to the Administration Commission for final review. See id.; FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3184(9)b,(10)b (1997). The Administration Commission is composed of the Governor and
the Cabinet and is empowered to levy sanctions against local governments which have improperly
amended their comprehensive plans. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294; see also FIA. STAT. §
163.3184(l1)(a) (1997).
105. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1294. The court also noted that the Act itself requires that the
DCA apply the fairly debatable rule when judging plan amendments. See id. at 1295.
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analysis could provide some benefits, especially in some marginal cases.
Judge Pariente's argument that all plan amendments involve alteration of
policy far beyond the actual parcel clearly makes sense in most
situations.'06 There will be situations, however, when the relevant policy
considerations will be almost exclusively limited to the parcel in question.
The need for stricter scrutiny may be called for in such situations, given
that very few of the difficult policy decisions which led the Yusem court to
deem the amendment procedure legislative in nature would be present.
However elegant and logical the bright-line rule adopted in Yusem may be,
there remains a chance that local governments could both act without
sufficient justification and avoid strict scrutiny when the countervailing
government interests are not present.
The Yusem court did provide one potential answer to this concern. In
a footnote, the court took note of a 1995 statutory amendment that allows
for special, expedited review of comprehensive plan amendments that are
directly related to small-scale development plans.1°7 The court refused to
rule on the appropriate standard of review for such amendments, perhaps
leaving an opportunity to avoid the problems inherent in the Yusem brightline rule. 10 However, both the Fifth and First Districts recently reviewed
the question left open by the Yusem court and found no reason to apply a
different standard to small parcel comprehensive plan amendments. 9
In 1998, in Fleeman v. City of St. Augustine Beach, a landowner sought
an amendment to the City's comprehensive plan to change the designation
of a portion of his parcel to allow for commercial development.1 Since
the parcel was less than 10 acres in size, the owner, Mr. Fleeman, sought
the application under the small parcel amendment procedure."' Under that
procedure, the local government is not limited in the number of
amendments per year, need hold only one public hearing on any
amendment, and may also avoid mandatory state review. 12 Despite the
lenient rules provided for small parcel amendments, the Fleeman court
could find no reason to distinguish such proceedings from the standard
amendment procedure discussed in Yusem. 3 Instead, the court found that

106. See Yusern, 664 So. 2d at 981 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
107. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1293 n.6; FLA. STAT. § 163.3187(1)c (1997).
108. See id.

109. See Fleeman v. City of St. Augustine Beach, 728 So. 2d 1178,1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998);
City of Jacksonville Beach v. Coastal Dev. of N. Fla., 730 So. 2d 792,794-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
110. Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1179. A condemnation of a portion of the property had left only
.3863 acres of the parcel designation commercial. See id.
111. See id. at 1179; FLA. STAT. § 163.3187(1)c (1997).
112. See Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1180.
113. See id. Fleeman had also argued that since small-scale amendments affect a limited
number of persons, they should be deemed quasi-judicial under Snyder's functional analysis. See
id.
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114

the same policy concerns are involved in either proceeding.
In extending the Yusem bright-line, the Fleemancourt sought to avoid
inserting more uncertainty into a "still unsettled area of law."115 While the
Yusem rule has its benefits, the result in Fleeman represents some of its
potential inequities. Fleeman had been left with .3863 acres designated for
commercial use after a Department of Transportation condemnation, a little
116
more than one-half of the original size of the designated portion.
Although the court pointed to several potential policy interests involved in
the amendment of the parcel's designation, it remains that the City had
previously deemed it wise to designate more than half of an acre of the
property commercial.117 Therefore, the policy concerns involved in a small
addition of commercial designation do not seem altogether weighty in this
case. The First District reviewed the issue in 1999's City of Jacksonville
Beach v. CoastalDevelopment of NorthFlorida,Inc. and held that smallscale plan amendment decisions are legislative in nature.118 The developer
in CoastalDevelopment had argued that the footnote in the Yusem opinion
represented an implicit recognition by the supreme court that small-scale
amendments should be held to a different standard. 19 Therefore, the
developer argued, small-scale amendment decisions should be deemed
quasi-judicial in nature."2 The court disagreed, holding that the Yusem
court did not deem small-scale amendment decisions different through the
footnote; instead, the court was simply "leaving to a future day the
question of the appropriate standard of review." ' Addressing the issue,
the CoastalDevelopment court followed the Fleeman court's reasoning,
finding that all comprehensive plan amendments "necessarily involve a
formulation of policy."' The court also observed in the Yusem decision
a "clear intent to bring predictability to an area of the law in which

114. See id. The court relied on analysis similar to Judge Pariente's as quoted in Yusem,
focusing on the important policy decisions involved in every plan amendment in comparison to the
considerations involved in a rezoning action. See id.
115. Id. The court found that a functional approach would raise more questions than it would
answer. See id. The court did note, however, that the parcel in question was located "on a major
thoroughfare, close to the ocean, and perhaps near environmentally sensitive land." Id. This implies
that a functional analysis would garner the same result: an amendment of this parcel would be
legislative since it would involve important public interests. Given the significant public interest
relied on in Section 28 Partnership,however, the public interest involved in Fleemanseems paltry.
See supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
116. See Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1179.
117. See id.
118. 730 So. 2d 792, 794-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
119. See id. at 794.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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confusion had been prevalent."'" The court held that finding small-scale
amendment decisions legislative in nature would assist in that goal through
assuring a uniform approach to all comprehensive amendment requests. 24
So, like the Fleemancourt, the CoastalDevelopment court decided that a
bright-line approach was preferable to the uncertainty of a case-by-case
functional analysis. However, the application of the Yusem rule to smallscale amendment decisions has dangers of its own.
The situation in Fleeman represents the dangers inherent in an
extension of the Yusem rule to small-scale amendment decisions. Fleeman
lost some of his property to condemnation by the state government; the
City then declined to restore his lost commercial potential in a situation in
which serious City interests were likely not involved. 5 Under the fairly
debatable standard, landowners like Fleeman have little recourse against
such decisions, however inequitable the result. Under the Fleeman and
CoastalDevelopment courts' extension of Yusem, similar situations will
inevitably occur. Whether the resulting damage will outweigh the
acknowledged benefits of a bright-line rule remains to be seen.
Despite the supreme court's hope in Yusem that some needed clarity
could be brought to the standard of review of land use decisionmaking by
local governments, at least one case points to some continuing confusion
at the District level. 126 Decided just five days after Yusem, the Third
District's opinion in Debes v. City of Key West suggests that the supreme
court may not have been clear enough. 127
The petitioner in Debes owned undeveloped property in the City of Key
West. 2 ' The City's FLUM designated the property Medium Density
129
Residential, a designation which barred all commercial development.
The City Planner made three attempts to convince the City Commission to
amend the FLUM to change the property's designation to Commercial
General, a designation that would allow commercial development.130 Each
application to amend the comprehensive plan was rejected by the City

123. Id. In this the court was clearly correct. Just a quick glance at the Fourth District cases
which preceded Yusem makes it clear that the lower courts were drawing some unclear and arbitrary
lines when they applied a functional analysis. See supratext accompanying notes 56-79.
124. See CoastalDevelopment, 730 So. 2d at 794. The court also certified the standard of
review issue to the supreme court as a question of great public importance. See id. at 795. This
decision provides the supreme court with the discretion to hear the case. See FLA. CONST. art. V,

§ 3(b)5.
125. See Fleeman, 728 So. 2d at 1179.

126. See Yusem, 690 So. 2d at 1293.

127. 690 So. 2d 700,701 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
128. See id.
129. See id.

130. See id.Thecity's PlanningBoard approved each application of the City Plannerto amend
the plan. See id.
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Commission.'
The district court quashed the circuit court's ruling that the denial was
valid, holding that the City's action was impermissible reverse "spot
planning" and thus illegal.13 The result of the case was not remarkable; the
potential problem with the Debes decision, however, lies in the standard
of review applied.133 The court found the Snyder rule provided the
appropriate standard to judge the validity of the City's actions, despite the
fact that the Yusem decision explicitly required the fairly debatable
standard for comprehensive plan amendment decisions. 34 There is no
mistaking that the court was aware of the Yusem decision before ruling in
135
Debes, the opinion even cites to Yusem in a footnote.
Despite the court's finding that Snyder should apply, the court noted
that the standard of review was "not determinative or even important in
[the] consideration of the case.' 36 The court also noted that the facts of the
case before them would "yield the same result" regardless of which
standard of review was utilized. 137 This statement does not provide the
answer, however, to why
the court felt that Snyder should apply in the face
38
of Yusem's command.1
While the court may have been right that the facts presented in Debes
were so compelling that they would have overcome the fairly debatable

131. See id. The petitioner sued after each rejection of the amendment. See id. at n.1. The first
two suits resulted in the circuit court quashing the denials. See id. The third denial was upheld by
the circuit court. See id.
132. Id. In the court's opinion, the city's action was "spot-planning in reverse" because the
denial essentially allowed the petitioner's property to remain singled out for unfavorable treatment
in the plan. Id. The petitioner's property was surrounded on all sides by parcels that were
designated for commercial uses. See id. "Spot zoning" in the classic sense means providing a
benefit to a particular parcel that is denied to surrounding parcels. "Reverse" spot zoning would be
just the opposite: denying a single parcel a benefit shared by the surrounding properties. This, in
the court's view, was "spot-planning in reverse' because the city discriminated against the
petitioner through planning rather than zoning. Id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at n.4.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. One potential answer lies in the temporal proximity of the Yusem and Debes
decisions, barely a week apart. The city in Debeshad argued that Snyder should be the appropriate
standard of review and that the decision of the city was justified by substantial competent evidence,
an indication that Yusem was not decided at the time. See id. Given Yusem's utility to the city's
position, it is highly unlikely that the city's attorney would not have used Yusem as support if it was
available. It may have been that the Debes court had made its ruling before Yusem was decided and
rather than revisit the issue in the light of Yusem the court simply added a reference to Yusem to a
footnote of the opinion. See id. at n.4. Thus, the language in the opinion suggesting that any
standard of review would yield the same result may have been inserted at least partially as a
justification for failing to apply Yusem. See id.
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rule's deference for local government decisions, compelling facts should
not providejustification for applying an inapplicable standard of review.' 39
Given the clarity of the Yusem decision, however, it is unlikely that more
decisions akin to Debeswill be forthcoming. Debes seems to be unique in
its failure to correctly apply the rule. The harm resulting from the court's
failure is thus likely to be minimal.
V. DEFINING STRICT SCRUTINY DowN?:
THE PROBLEM OF CrIZEN TESTIMONY

Along with feeling out the boundaries of what types of actions will be
deemed quasi-judicial, the courts have also been wrestling with what
constitutes "substantial, competent evidence" in the zoning and planning
context."4 The Snyder decision places the burden on the local government
to show that a rejection of a zoning change request was supported by
substantial competent evidence.' 4 ' The Supreme Court of Florida has
defined substantial evidence as "such evidence as will establish a
substantial basis of fact from which one fact at issue can be reasonably
inferred."' 42 This standard, while not strict scrutiny in the constitutional
143
sense, is significantly more rigorous than the fairly debatable rule.
Perhaps the greatest source of arbitrary decisionmaking in the zoning
context is what some commentators have called "neighborhoodism," or the
influence placed on local government by neighbors of the parcel in
question.' 4 Courts have long pondered over how to weigh the testimony
of neighbors, and what kind of such testimony should be considered a valid
basis for local government decisionmaking.145 The Snyder decision did
little to remove the question; in contrast, its requirement of substantial
competent evidence makes the question of the validity of citizen testimony
even more pressing.
The leading Florida case on citizen testimony in zoning decisionmaking
is 1974's City of Apopka v. Orange County. 46 In Apopka, the Orange

County Commission rejected a request to change the zoning of a large

139. See id.

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.; see also Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 471.

144. Id. at 472-73 (quoting from RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966)).

145. See generally City of Apopka v. Orange County, 299 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA
1974) (noting that although interested parties should be given achanceto express their views about
applications for special exceptions or zoning changes, Board of Commissions is not required to
hold a plebiscite).
146. Id.
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parcel to allow for the construction of an airport. 147 The Commission had
heard the testimony of citizens who opposed the plan.1 48 In a much cited
opinion, the Fourth District found that the Commission had impermissibly
relied on "laymen's opinions unsubstantiated by any competent facts." 49
The court found that the Commission had essentially conducted an opinion
poll of the electorate rather than eliciting relevant facts from the members
of the public. 150 Thus, later courts have taken the Apopka court's ruling to
mean that "generalized statements of opposition" on the part of the public
are to be ignored, but fact-based testimony is valid evidence.' Thus, as
long as a citizen's testimony is fact-based, it will generally be deemed
"competent."
If courts are in agreement that fact-based testimony from neighbors is
acceptable in zoning and planning decisionmaking, there is still some
confusion as to the weight to be given such testimony. In other words, how
much and what kind of citizen testimony can support a local government's
rejection of a rezoning request? Three cases from the Third District
provide a glimpse at how certain kinds of citizen testimony have been
found to constitute substantial competent evidence in such a way that
possibly endangers the purpose of the Snyder decision.
In MetropolitanDade County v. Blumenthal, the Third District court,
sitting en banc, quashed the circuit court's reversal of the County's
decision to reject a rezoning application."' The circuit court had rejected
the testimony of neighbors to the project, finding it "'conclusionary and
without adequate support."" 53 The district court disagreed, finding that the
circuit court had misinterpreted Apopka in rejecting what was fact-based
testimony by the neighbors. 4
The testimony in question was of Mr. Morgan Levy. " Levy had spoken
against the landowner's proposal to build 18 units per acre on the property,
56
instead requesting that the development be limited to 13 units per acre.
Levy had introduced, without objection, a diagram of the area surrounding
the parcel.' 57 He had also, without objection, drawn a line on the diagram

147. Id. at 660.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 659.
151. Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598, 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
(rehearing en banc and adopting Judge Cope's dissent to the panel opinion as the opinion of the
court).

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 610.
Id. at 606 (quoting circuit court opinion at 3).
See id. at 606-07.
See id. at 601.
See id. at 602.
See id. at 607.
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showing where previous zoning decisions had limited densities to 13 units
per acre.1 5' The parcel in question was located within the area on Levy's
diagram where other properties were limited to 13 units per acre.' 59 The
district court noted that there was no dispute as to the factual validity of
Levy's testimony. 6°
The County Commission's resolution denying the zoning change noted
'
that the proposed change was "'incompatible with the neighborhood.""'
62
Levy's testimony essentially went to that question.' He sought to
demonstrate how a development of 18 units per acre would be
incompatible with surrounding developments limited to 13 units per
acre. 63 The district court quite reasonably found that Levy's uncontested,
fact-based testimony was competent and properly part of the substantial
evidence the County relied on in rejecting the proposed change.' 64 The
problem which would soon appear in the wake of Blumenthal,however, is
that neighbor testimony of incompatibility can assume a role of such
importance that it alone becomes capable of derailing a rezoning
application.
A step in that direction was taken in the Third District's opinion in
MetropolitanDade County v. SportacresDevelopment Group, Inc. 16' The
property owner in Sportacreshad sought zoning variances that would have
allowed it to excavate a lake and develop a subdivision which did not meet
the frontage and lot area requirements of the current zoning designation.'66
The County's Zoning Appeals Board approved the application with 39
conditions after a hearing at which a group of neighbors testified in
opposition. 67
The neighbors appealed the decision to the County Commission which,
68
after two public hearings, overruled the Zoning Appeals Board decision.
The property owner petitioned the circuit court for relief and the court

158. See id. at 603.
159. See id.
160. See id.at 606.
161. Id.at 603.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 605.
165. 698 So. 2d 281,282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The Snyder framework is not directly on point
in this case since the developer was not seeking a rezoning permit but unusual use and non-use
variances permits. See Sportacres Dev. Group, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 4 Fla. L. Weekly
Supp. 432, 434 (1996). The decision is still relevant, however, because of its discussion of
substantial competent evidence and neighbor testimony.
166. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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reversed the Commission's decision. 6 9 The circuit court found that the
Commission had impermissibly based its decision on unsubstantiated lay
opinion rather than the other competent, substantial evidence in the
record. 170

The Third District reversed the circuit court, finding that the
Commission had substantial competent evidence supporting the decision
before it.' 71 The court noted that the Commission had access to a record
which "contained maps, reports and other information which, in
conjunction with the testimony of the neighbors, if believed by the
Commission, constituted competent substantial evidence." 72
7
The neighbors' testimony before the board addressed three issues. 1
First, the neighbors expressed concern about the lot size variance, arguing
that the smaller size of lots in the development would make it incompatible
with the surrounding neighborhood. 74 The neighbors also argued that the
smaller lots would negatively affect their property values.' 75 The third
major concern raised by the neighbors was that176the large lake to be built in
the development would be a "health hazard.'
The problems with the neighbor's testimony as to the latter two issues
are clear. As the circuit court noted, the neighbors presented only one piece
of factual evidence as to the potential for decreased property values. 17 That
evidence consisted of testimony that one local resident had recently sold
a home for $175,000 while the mid-range home price of the proposed
development was to be $110,000.178 While factually based, such testimony
was properly rejected by the circuit court as insufficient. 179 Both the circuit
and district court are silent as to the type of evidence presented as to the
health hazard concern. Regardless, the relevance of both the health hazard

169. See Sportacres,4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 434.
170. See id.
171. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Sportacres,4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 433.
175. See id.
176. Sportacres, 698 So. 2d at 282. This issue is the source of much of the notoriety the
Sportacres decision enjoys in Dade County. Telephone interview with John Shubin, Attorney for
Barbara Watson (Mar. 8, 1999). The property at issue is located in a predominately AfricanAmerican community. See id. One of the neighbors' arguments was that the large proposed lake
would be a health hazard to the community because many African-Americans have poor swimming
skills and would risk drowning. See id. The concern over the use of the so-called "blacks can't

swim" argument is probably misplaced. See id. It was not even presented to the district court, so
its competence is irrelevant. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-11, Metropolitan Dade County
v. Sportacres Dev. Group, Inc., 698 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
177. See Sportacres,4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 433.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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testimony and the testimony as to lower property values is questionable
because the County made its decision based on incompatibility with the
surrounding area." 0
The neighbors' testimony as to compatibility with the neighborhood
largely consisted of a comparison of the home sizes in the area with the
development's proposed home sizes.'
The existing homes in the
surrounding area were 7,500 square feet.'82 The proposed home size in the
development would be 4,500 square feet. 8 3 The circuit court found that
such evidence was insufficient to show incompatibility.&I The circuit court
found that the neighbors had failed to explain why the smaller lots would
be incompatible with the surrounding area.8 5 Under the circuit court's
rubric, therefore, merely pointing out a fairly significant difference in home
size is insufficient to show incompatibility.8 6
The circuit court noted that to allow such evidence to foil a variance
request would contravene the County's policy of allowing such variances
in the first place.'87 Since variance requests, by definition, will involve land
uses which differ, often significantly, from the surrounding area, evidence
of this difference should not alone be sufficient to deny a variance
request. 88 The district court opinion does not explicitly reject this
argument; it simply states that substantial competent evidence existed to
support the board's decision.8 9 Implicit assumptions can be made,
however, that indeed the district court did find the evidence of
incompatibility sufficient." 9°
It may be that incompatibility with the surrounding neighborhood is
within alay person's competency and the Commission correctly considered
the neighbors' testimony. If, as other courts have found, lay people can
testify as to "natural beauty," they are probably equally qualified to testify

180. See id. at 434.
181. See id. at 433.
182. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282. The surrounding homes were required to be 7,500
square feet because of restrictive covenants entered into in the early 1960s. See Sportacres,4 Fla.
L. Weekly Supp. at 433.
183. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282.
184. See Sportacres,4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 433.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. The circuit court's argument would likely have the same force in the rezoning
context. A request to change a zoning designation from one dwelling per acre to two in an area of
single family homes on acre plots, for example, could easily be deemed incompatible simply on
visual inspection.
189. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282.
190. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-11, Metropolitan Dade County v. Sportacres Dev.
Group, Inc., 698 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
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as to any aesthetic incompatibility.19 ' Therefore, the testimony in
Sportacreswas likely competent in that it does not take an expert witness
to testify that existing homes are significantly larger than the homes in a
proposed development. The question remains, however, whether evidence
of a difference in home sizes or other aesthetic concerns should suffice to
support a finding of incompatibility with the surrounding neighborhood.
If so, very few variances or significant rezoning actions would ever be
granted in the face of well informed neighborhood opposition. The
problems inherent in permitting such evidence to alone support a rejection
of a proposed zoning change were soon vividly demonstrated in another
Third District opinion,
1998's MetropolitanDade County v. Section 11
192
Corp.
Property
The landowner in Section 11 filed an application for a special zoning
exception to allow it to develop a self-storage facility on its parcel.193 The
proposed use was allowed under the parcel's zoning designation if
accepted at a public hearing.'94 Under the special exception framework, the
validity of the request is presumed and denial must be supported by
substantial competent evidence that the exception would be adverse to the
public interest and would be incompatible with the surrounding area or the
comprehensive plan. 195
When the special exception proposal came before the County
Commission, staff supported the application as compatible with the
surrounding area.' 96 Opposing the application was a group of neighbors."9
The neighbors' objections to the proposed facility included the increased
traffic and noise and the decrease in property values that they believed
would result, as well as concerns about the aesthetic qualities of such a
facility.'98 The Commission denied the special exception because
of
99
"incompatibility with the surrounding area and its development."'
Upon certiorari review, the circuit court found that substantial
competent evidence did not exist to support the denial. 200 The court found
that the neighbors' testimony on incompatibility was insufficient because

191. Board of County Comm'rs v. City of Clearwater, 440 So. 2d 497,499 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983).
192. 719 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
193. See Section 11 Property Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 517,
518 (1998).
194. See id. The relevant standard was the equivalent of a rezoning request under Snyder.See
id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 517.
200. See id.at 519.
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it had no factual support.2 1 Instead of facts, the circuit court found that the
neighbors' testimony constituted an "emotional outpouring., 20 2 Thus, the
circuit court had found a classic Apopka situation: neighbor testimony
consisting solely of opinion. 2 3 To the contrary, the Third District court on
review found that the neighbor's testimony was competent, fact-based, and
part of the substantial competent evidence supporting the denial.2' 4 The
district court accordingly reversed the circuit's decision.20 5
The district court focused exclusively on the aesthetic concerns of the
neighbors, wisely ignoring the traffic, noise and property value
questions.2 '° The court noted that several neighbors had described the
proposed facility as "'industrial' and thus incompatible with the
neighborhood. 2 7 The court also quoted another neighbor who described the
project as an "'eyesore' and commented that no amount of landscaping
could enhance its appearance.2 8 This neighbor argued that any attempt at
landscaping would be akin to "'trying to put an elephant in a
Volkswagen [sic], you still know the elephant is there.""'2 It was this
testimony that the district court found to be fact-based and a worthy basis
for a denial of the special exception.1
In Section 11, the dangers lying under the surface in Blumenthal and
Sportacresfinally came to light. There, the neighbor testimony was not 21
an
uncontested demonstration of relative zoning densities as in Blumenthal. '
Neither did the testimony deal with the relative sizes of homes in the
212 In
proposed development and the surrounding area as in Sportacres.
Section 11, the testimony found to be competent was purely aesthetic; the
neighbors simply did not want an unattractive, "'industrial"' building in
their neighborhood and sought to block it.213 There seems to be no doubt
that the special exception would have passed absent the neighbor's

201. See id. To the contrary, the circuit court noted that the county staff had presented "more
than ample evidence" of compatibility, at least for noise and traffic concerns. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Section 11 Property Corp., 719 So. 2d 1204, 1205
(1998).
205. See id.
206. See id. There is little doubt that the testimony presented by the neighbors on both traffic
and property values was far from competent, since it consisted of nothing but opinion. See Section
11, 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 518.
207. Section 11,719 So. 2d at 1205. In the immediate area surrounding the parcel there was
a gas station and an auto supply store. See Section 11, 5 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 517.
208. Section 11, 719 So. 2d at 1205.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 602.
212. See Sportacres,698 So. 2d at 282.
213. 719 So. 2d at 1205.
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Thus,the result in Section 11 indicates that Snyder may have
testimony. 214 Tute
not adequately reduced the danger of "neighborhoodism" in local
government decisionmaking.
The testimony seen in Section 11 was not by itself illicit. Neighbors
should be free to testify on the aesthetic compatibility of proposed
development. The question again is whether neighbor testimony on
aesthetic compatibility should be the sole basis of the requisite substantial
competent evidence. If so, the line between acceptable fact-based
testimony and unacceptable Apopka opinion testimony would be blurred
beyond recognition. Is testimony calling a project an "eyesore" opinion or,
as the district court in Section 11 found, "fact-based testimony regarding
... aesthetic incompatibility?"2 15 Even if legitimately competent, such
aesthetic testimony should not be allowed to alone support a local
government decision. Otherwise, neighbors would be given a tool of
incredible and all too easily abused power. If other courts follow the
Section 11 reasoning, the Snyder rule may be in some danger. It becomes
quixotic to demand substantial competent evidence when testimony such
as presented in Section 11 suffices.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE
POST-SNYDER WORLD
The Snyder court's reconstruction of the way local land use decisions
are reviewed introduced some new confusion into the proper role of courts
in the process. Perhaps most importantly, the Snyder decision placed land
use jurisprudence into an ongoing and contentious debate about the role of
district courts in reviewing circuit court appellate decisions.2 16 Under the
Snyder rubric, initial review of local land use decisions is by certiorari to
the circuit court. 7
By deeming local zoning decisionmaking a quasi-judicial undertaking,
the Snyder court signaled the circuit courts to utilize a review procedure
equivalent to the one applied to administrative agency decisions. 8 The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that circuit court review of an
administrative decision is limited to whether procedural due process was

214. See id. at 1204. Given that the county staff pressed for approval, it seems very unlikely
that a contrary decision would have been made absent the neighborhood resistance.
215. Id. at 1205.

216. See generally City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1982)
(discussing appropriateness of district courts' review of circuit court decisions in administrative
matters).
217. See Snyder,627 So. 2d 469,476 (1993).
218. See id. at 474-76; see also Town of Mangonia Park v.Palm Beach Oil,Inc., 436 So.2d
1138, 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (discussing the limited review of administrative agency decisions
by circuit courts).
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accorded, the essential requirements of the law were observed, and the
findings were supported by competent substantial evidence. 2 9 By limiting
the circuit courts to determining whether the local government had
competent substantial evidence before it, the Snyder court implicitly denied
the circuit court the ability to re-evaluate the evidence. 220 Therefore, the
local government's decision, as long as it is supported by competent
substantial evidence, is entitled to deference and should not be secondguessed by the reviewing circuit court.
The Snyder court noted that further review at the district court level
would be governed by the court's 1982 decision in City of DeerfieldBeach
v. Vaillant. The boundaries of review laid out by the Snyder court,
however, were soon tested, and in some cases, breached. Under Vaillant,
a district court's certiorari review is limited to a determination of whether
the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied the correct
law.222 The second element of the review, the correct application of law,
would soon become an issue in two ways. First, courts differed on how
egregious such an incorrect application must be to trigger appellate
reversal. Second, courts have questioned what actually constitutes an
incorrect application of law.
The first question has been answered by the supreme court. The second
remains open to disagreement.
A. When Is DistrictCourtReview in Order?
A year after the Vaillantdecision, the Supreme Court of Florida again
dealt with the issue of the scope of certiorari review by district courts.223 In
Combs v. State, the court reviewed the application of a "departure from the
essential requirements of law" standard for reviewing the actions of a
circuit court." The court found that district courts should look to both the
existence and seriousness of legal error and reverse a lower court only
when "there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law
resulting in a miscarriage ofjustice."2 ' The court went on to note that such
a standard is appropriate to avoid certiorari review in the district court
becoming essentially a second appeal.226
The supreme court seemed to retreat from the language in Combs and
return to Vaillant's arguably more broad standard of review in 1989's
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626.
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476; see also Town of MangoniaPark,436 So. 2d at 1139.
See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
See Vaillant, 419 So. 2d at 626.
See Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1983).
Id. Note that Combs was not a zoning decision, but a criminal case.
Id.
See id.
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Education Development Center,Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach Zoning
Board of Appeals.2 7 The court again dealt with the extent of a district
court's certiorari review and, quoting language from Vaillant, found that
the "application of the correct law" standard was appropriate. 28 The
EducationDevelopment court never mentioned the "miscarriage ofjustice"
language seen in Combs, creating an implication that the Combs
framework was too restrictive on district courts. 2 9 However, the court did
not explicitly overturn, or even mention, Combs. 30
The supreme court addressed the apparent contradiction between
Combs and Education Development in 1995's Haines City Community
Development v. Heggs and found that the seemingly disparate standards
were synonymous. 231 After a review of each case, the Heggs' court found
that both standards "reduced to their core" were the same. 32 What the
standard approved in Heggs actually consists of, however, seems to be the
Combs's rule. The court quoted with approval the district court's opinion
which included the "miscarriage of justice" language from Combs, noting
that the district court's analysis "captures the essence" of the holdings in
Combs and EducationDevelopment.233 Thus, the Heggs court seemed to
reiterate Combs's focus on limiting district court review.
TheHeggs decision has important bearing on the Snyder court's finding
that district court review should be ruled by Vaillant's "application of the
correct law" standard.234 Even though the "miscarriage ofjustice" language
of Combs is not directly repeated by the court in Heggs, the court does
quote it with approval.2 35 District courts, without exception at this date,
have also adopted the Heggs standard as if it required a miscarriage of
justice to reverse a circuit court.236 Therefore, the Heggs decision seems to
have created an environment where district courts are more limited in their
ability to reverse circuit court decisions. Parties successful at the circuit
level would thus be wise to emphasize the "miscarriage of justice"
227. 541 So. 2d 106,108 (Fla. 1989). EducationDevelopment was azoning case, and its result
seemed to indicate both that the Vaillantand Combs standards were disparate and that zoning cases
should be treated under Vaillant instead of Combs.
228. Id.

229. Id. at 107-09.
230. See id.
231. 658 So. 2d 523, 529-31 (Fla. 1995).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 531.
234. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 476.
235. Heggs, 658 So. 2d at 531.
236. See, e.g., G.B.V. Int'l, Ltd. v. Broward County, 709 So. 2d 155, 155 (Fla. 4th DCA
1998); Seminole County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Eden Park Village, Inc., 699 So. 2d 334,335
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Bird-Kendall Homeowners Assoc. v. Metropolitan Dade County Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 695 So. 2d 908, 909-10 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1997); Debes v. City of Key West, 690
So. 2d 700,703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
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language of Combs at the district court in order to discourage reversal.

B. What Is the Extent of DistrictCourt Review?
The more central question left open by Heggs, however, is the breadth
of review included in the "applied the correct law" standard. This is
perhaps most important in the zoning context when the circuit court has
found that no substantial competent evidence existed to support a local
government decision. Courts have recently been wrestling with the
question of whether the circuit court's determination regarding substantial
competent evidence should be deferred to or scrutinized as an application
of law.
The Third District reviewed the issue in Blumenthaland found that the
district courts' scope of certiorari review in zoning matters encompassed
the review of a circuit court's determination of whether substantial
competent evidence existed.237 The court found that:
[A]ll the district courts that have addressed this scope of
review issue are in accord that where the circuit court applies
an incorrect legal standard and erroneously determines that a
zoning decision is not supported by substantial competent
evidence or where the record is clear that the court has
impermissibly reweighed the evidence . . . certiorari is
available to the aggrieved party.238
The court's latter assertion is well accepted; a circuit court would be
exceeding its own certiorari jurisdiction if it reweighed the evidence before
the local government, or reversed the decision simply because it disagreed
with the local government's evaluation of the evidence.239
The former assertion, that the review of the "application of the legal
standard" somehow includes the circuit court's determination of whether
substantial competent evidence existed, is more problematic.
Such

237. See Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 608-09. The panel opinion was released one month prior
to the Heggs decision and thus the court relied on Vaillantfor the breadth of certiorari review. See
id. at 607.
238. Id. at 608-09.
239. See generallyTown of Mangonia Park v. Palm Beach Oil, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1138, 1139
(1983) (holding that the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the town code enforcement
board).
240. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 608. It is unclear from the opinion exactly which errors the
court found in the circuit court's reasoning. See id. at 608-09. The court did quote at length the
Fourth District's opinion in City of Ft.Lauderdalev. Multidyne Waste Management,Inc., where
that court had found that a circuit court had erroneously deemed evidence incompetent and also
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review would be appropriate if the circuit court erroneously rejected the
sole competent evidence supporting the decision, for example. However,
the line between a proper review of a circuit court's actions and an
invasion of the circuit's discretion is far from clear. When it is arguable
that no substantial competent evidence existed, revisiting the issue and
reversing the circuit court's determination seems to be dangerously close
to the "second appeal" the supreme court warned of in Combs. 241 Under the
Vaillant/Heggs framework, such a level of review would be
inappropriately broad for certiorari review."4a
The confusion inherent in the review of circuit court determinations
that no substantial competent evidence existed was recently demonstrated
by the Fourth District's opinion in City of Dania v. FloridaPower &
Light.24 The court noted that it could not reweigh the evidence before the
local government, but found that its scope of review did include a
determination of "whether the circuit court exceeded its scope of review
and substituted its own factual findings" for the local government's. 44 The
court then proceeded to revisit the issue of substantial competent evidence
and found that indeed there was sufficient evidence to support the local
government's decision. 2 s Because the court could find no reason why the
circuit court did not recognize substantial competent evidence in the
record, it ruled that the circuit court had reweighed the evidence.246
The FloridaPower& Light decision demonstrates how unclear the line
is between a district court reviewing the application of law made by a
circuit court and a district court actually reweighing the evidence itself. In
order to find that the circuit court impermissibly reweighed the evidence,
the district court felt it necessary to revisit the record.247 In the record, the
court found sufficient evidence to support the local government's
decision. 48 Therefore, the court came to the conclusion that the circuit
court had substituted its judgment for the local government's. 49 The
court's only justification for this finding seems to be that, given the
existence of competent substantial evidence in the record, the circuit court
must have impermissibly reweighed the evidence. Otherwise, it follows,

reweighed the evidence before the local government. See id. at 608 (quoting 567 So. 2d 955 (Fla.
4th DCA 1990)). The Blumenthal court noted that the same reasoning applied in the case before
them. See id.
241. Combs, 436 So. 2d at 95.
242. See Vaillant,419 So. 2d at 626.
243. 718 So. 2d 813,815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 816.
246. See id. at 817.
247. See id. at816.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 817.
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the circuit court could not have reversed the local government's decision.
The circuit court in FloridaPower & Light had not explicitly rejected
the evidence the district found was substantial.2 50 It had simply found that
substantial competent evidence had not existed.2 1 If the circuit had
explicitly deemed a class of competent evidence inappropriate and relied
on such to overturn the local government decision, the district court would
have been justified in finding the circuit incorrectly applied the law. But
the circuit had not done so, making the district court's action appear to be
a reweighing of the evidence.
The district court relied on the silence of the circuit court opinion
regarding certain testimony presented by the local government to signal
that the circuit court had disregarded the evidence and thus substituted its
judgment. 3 It is questionable whether a circuit court's silence on a
specific item of evidence should allow a district court to assume that the
circuit court had impermissibly found that evidence incompetent. To allow
such action in all cases would open nearly every such appeal to a
revisitation of the evidence presented to the local government and a new
determination of competence and substantiality.
More generally, it is possible for district courts to utilize the standard
of review applied in Blumenthaland FloridaPower & Light to revisit, and
potentially reweigh, every circuit court finding of no substantial competent
evidence. In order to find a circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction by
reweighing the evidence before the local government, the district court
must make a determination if substantial competent evidence existed. To
make this determination, the district court will essentially replicate the
circuit court's investigation of the record. If the district court finds that the
local government had enough evidence before it, it can then find that the
circuit court necessarily reweighed the evidence. Such a result occurred in
Florida Power & Light." The district court found that the circuit
reweighed the evidence because it had recognized substantial competent
evidence that the circuit court did not. 55 Thus, despite the restrictions of
the Vaillant rule, the very investigation of the circuit court's action by the
district court can essentially become a "second appeal" at least for the
question of substantial competent evidence.
In her concurrence to the FloridaPower & Light opinion, Judge Warner
pointed out language from EducationDevelopment which, in her opinion,
indicated that district courts cannot review circuit court determinations of

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id. at 816.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See 1d. at 817.
See id.
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whether substantial competent evidence existed. 6 First, the court in
Education Development had quashed the district court's order because it
had simply "disagreed with the circuit court's evaluation of the
evidence." 7 Moreover, Justice McDonald, in his dissent in Education
Development, had argued that the majority's decision had in fact precluded
district courts from reviewing circuit court's determinations of whether
competent substantial evidence existed.25 Therefore, Judge Warner
concluded that Education Development had foreclosed the review
undertaken by the FloridaPower & Light court.2 9
Whether EducationDevelopment did foreclose the type of review used
by the Blumenthal and FloridaPower & Light courts is an open question.
It certainly does seem that any such review can involve a new investigation
of the evidence before the local government. This type of review comes
very close to being a second appeal of the substantial competent evidence
question, seemingly in violation of the spirit, if not the rule of Vaillant,
Education Development, and Heggs.2' 6 Of all the questions which have
arisen in the wake of Snyder, this issue is perhaps the most ripe for review
by the supreme court. The court may find, as Justice McDonald argued in
his EducationDevelopmentdissent, that preventing district reviews of this
issue would turn circuit court judges into the "absolute czars in zoning
matters." 261 Given the centrality of the determination of whether substantial
competent evidence existed to the Snyder framework, circuit courts would
likely very rarely be reversed. The court could then rule that district courts
may review such questions to prevent abuse at the circuit level. As it stands
currently, however, it seems that such review may be outside the
jurisdiction of the district courts and the Blumenthal and Section 11 courts
exceeded that jurisdiction.
VII. CONCLUSION

The legacy of the Snyder decision after six years seems to be a mixed
one. Some issues have since been clarified while others have become
hopelessly muddled. On the positive side, the Yusem court provided needed
clarity to the comprehensive plan issue after the confusion created by the
district courts' use of Snyder's functional analysis.2 62 However, the Yusem

256. See id. at 818 (Warner, J., concurring specially). Judge Warner agreed that the circuit
court should be reversed because it imposed an "especially heavy burden" on the city because the
proposed use was an essential service. Id. at 817.
257. Id. at 818 (quoting Education Development, 541 So. 2d at 108-09).
258. Id. (quoting EducationDevelopment, 541 So. 2d at 109 (McDonald, J., dissenting)).
259. See id.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 218-32.
261. EducationDevelopment, 541 So. 2d at 109 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 90-105.
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bright-line approach, as extended by Fleeman and CoastalDevelopment,
has left an opportunity for local governments to act arbitrarily when
reviewing small parcel comprehensive plan amendments. 263 The supreme
court has yet to clarify whether its footnote in Yusem truly meant that
small-scale amendments are to be held to a different standard. Hopefully,
the court will take up the issue in the near future.
The Third District's wholesale acceptance of aesthetic testimony by
neighbors, as evidenced most notably in Section 11, demonstrates that the
substantial competent evidence standard may not be as effective as once
thought in limiting arbitrary decisions. 2 4 While such testimony should be
considered competent, real questions persist whether it should be
considered alone sufficient to support a local government's decision. If the
Section 11 view of substantial competent evidence is widely adopted,
Snyder's ultimate impact will be unduly lessened.265
The supreme court's Heggs decision also bears heavily on the way land
use decisions are reviewed.266 By emphasizing the language from Combs
cited with approval by the Heggs court, parties victorious at the circuit
court level may be able to avoid reversal if the district court fails to find
' Finally, the broad approach
that errors created a "miscarriage ofjustice."267
to certiorari review embraced by the Blumenthal and FloridaPower &
Light courts has demonstrated how evidence can be reweighed when a
district court is investigating the circuit court's application of the law.268
This approach is arguably directly contrary to the framework the Snyder
court sought to establish for review of zoning decisions. 269 More
concretely, it seems to provide a "second appeal" at least for the
determination of whether the local government had substantial competent
evidence before it.270
The issues raised by Section 11 and FloridaPower & Light are perhaps
the most pressing for supreme court review. The Section 11 rule presents
a real danger of dilution of the substantial competent evidence standard.
The Florida Power & Light decision may be equally dangerous to the
proper functioning of certiorari review at the district court level. A
resolution of these outstanding issues would go far towards assuring the

263. See supra text accompanying notes 105-24.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 191-214.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 191-214.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 230-35.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 230-35. This, of course, assumes that courts will
imbue "miscarriage of justice" with some substance in the land use context. While courts have
adopted the language from Combs, it is still an open question whether the standard has actually
changed.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 236-60.
269. See supra text and accompanying notes 236-60.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 236-60.
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Snyder rule's future efficacy. As it stands now, the rules adopted in these
two cases threaten to render Snyder a noble, but ultimately ineffective
attempt at reforming zoning jurisprudence.
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